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What is professional integrity and what makes it so important? Policies are designed to 
promote it and decisions are justified in its name. This paper identifies two competing 
conceptions of professional integrity and argues that, on their own, both are deficient. In 
response, this paper develops a third, interpretive view, in which professional integrity is 
conceived as the virtue of being good on the word of the practice. Professions ask for the 
public’s trust and in doing so, generate a set of legitimate expectations. Judgments of 
professional integrity are informed by an interpretation of practice that is sensitive to this 
normative situation. 
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Introduction 
Integrity is widely regarded as a key virtue for professionals. Two main kinds of 
reasons are commonly offered to explain the value assigned to professional 
integrity. The first kind concerns fidelity to the fundamental goals of the role. For 
example, the appeal to professional integrity in cases of conscientious objection in 
the medical context is often described in terms of loyalty to profession-specific ends, 
such as life and health. The second kind of reason is assurance; when issues of 
corruption and conflict of interest are debated, professional integrity is often 
emphasized as the virtue that gives us reason to trust role holders to place 
professional standards above self-interest.  
In this paper, I will develop an account of professional integrity as a distinct 
virtue (rather than just “ordinary” integrity in a special context), involving 
responsiveness to both fidelity and assurance. This view will be developed in a 
loosely Aristotelian way, as a response to two alternatives that turn out to be 
professional vices, which can be traced in the literature on professional integrity. 
One of these views emphasizes fidelity to the ends of a professional practice, as in 
health or education; this may be called the teleological view. The other alternative 
sees professional integrity as a matter of assurance and conceptually identical to 
ordinary integrity; this may be called the generic view. As a third alternative, I 
develop the interpretive view. On this account, professional integrity is distinct from 
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ordinary integrity but not because of a direct commitment to profession-specific 
ends. What makes professional integrity distinct is the way in which it calls for an 
interpretive judgment of what the role requires.  
 
  
The Teleological View 
The teleological view describes professional integrity as a commitment to key ends 
of professional practice, as in education or health. Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley 
(2001) provide a clear example of this approach: “For, characterising the goal of a 
profession in terms of the substantive good it undertakes to serve helps us better 
understand appeals to a notion of professional integrity as a reason for refusing to 
carry out certain requests for patients or clients” (Cocking & Oakley 2001: 83). 
Their main example is active voluntary euthanasia, which they claim “is to betray 
the goal of serving health which fundamentally defines their profession of medicine” 
(2001: 83). Even if it would be best for the patient to grant his or her autonomous 
request to be killed, doctors do not feel they act on this request in their capacity as 
doctors. In this way, the authors differentiate between personal and professional 
integrity. Active voluntary euthanasia may be compatible with personal integrity, 
but it must be performed with the “doctor’s hat off” (Cocking & Oakley 2001: 83). 
Cocking and Oakley refer with approval to an article by Franklin G. Miller and 
Howard Brody (1995) that expresses similar ideas but with an even stronger 
emphasis on the conception of professional integrity as concerned with profession-
internal values: “The acts of physicians of integrity must serve the proper ends or 
goals of medicine, and they must be ethically appropriate means to these ends in 
light of the values and norms internal to the practice of medicine” (Miller & Brody 
1995: 11). 
The insistence that professional integrity cannot be reduced to bureaucratic rule-
following or mere responsiveness to client or patient requests is an attractive feature 
of this approach. The teleological view accepts rules and requests only insofar as 
they are sanctioned by a legitimating end. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., a physician 
renowned for his literary skills as well as for reforming medical practices of the day, 
elegantly elaborated on the importance of this point, expressing only disdain for 
“plain practical workmen” who “go about the work of the day before them, doing it 
according to the rules of their craft, and asking no questions of the past or of the 
future, or of the aim and end to which their special labor is contributing” (Holmes 
1860: 8). Holmes drew a striking analogy to one of Sir William Edward Parry’s 
Arctic expeditions. The expedition was supposed to be racing towards the North 
Pole, but the ice they travelled on was drifting towards the Equator, and this reverse 
travel would remain undiscovered if everyone kept their eyes strictly on the track 
they were plodding. Holmes used this story to illustrate the necessity of seeing 
practice in light of its larger purpose: “It is not only going backward that the plain 
practical workman is liable to, if he will not look up and look around; he may go 
forward to ends he little dreams of” (Holmes 1860: 8). Holmes’s dreaded “plain 
practical workman” appears to be the opposite of an agent with professional 
integrity. The Arctic parable expresses the common understanding that professional 
integrity is a virtue that demands that role holders lift their gaze and allow their 
judgments to be informed by a sense of purpose. The virtuous alternative to the 
 Eriksen, A. Etikk i praksis. Nord J Appl Ethics (2015), 9 (2), 3–17                 5 
plain practical workman is a role holder who makes responsible judgments with a 
reach that extends beyond the immediate task.  
The teleological view would deny professional integrity to role holders who are 
unwilling to make evaluative judgments that reach beyond the immediate task. A 
doctor of integrity will see his actions in light of the overarching end of promoting 
health and not simply as performing assorted tasks without further connection. 
However, Holmes asked role holders to “look up and look around,” and the 
teleological view fails on the “look around” part. The teleological view requires role 
holders to be faithful to profession-specific ends, but does not ask them to integrate 
these ends with the wider array of legitimate expectations.1 Miller and Brody are 
very explicit about this: “Ethical considerations of respect for patient autonomy, 
social utility, and justice lie outside the domain of professional integrity, which 
constitutes the internal morality of medicine” (Miller & Brody 1995: 7; see also 
Lantos, Matlock, & Wendler 2011: 495).  
A figure inspired by the main character of the TV show House M.D. serves to 
illustrate how this view is problematic. Let’s call him Greg, and ignore the 
interpretive issues and various complexities in the series. Greg has exceptional 
diagnostic skills and a strong drive to solve medical puzzles. Understanding the 
nature of an illness is what matters to him, and he does not respect features of 
practice that constrain the pursuit of this end. According to Greg, procedural 
requirements, organizational hierarchy, collegial norms, and codes of ethics are 
more like annoying hurdles than genuine sources of reasons to moderate behavior.  
Importantly, Greg’s transgressions do not seem to be betrayals of a practice-
internal good. That is, his failings as a professional are not due to a pursuit of goals 
foreign to the heart of medicine. Greg is not acting in the name of self-interest, nor 
is he pursuing money or fame. His disrespect for what he considers mere 
conventions of practice is a consequence of his sincere commitment to providing 
correct treatment according to his own judgment. Greg only violates norms 
regulating patient autonomy or confidentiality when he believes there is some 
medical gain.  
Can defenders of the teleological view denounce Greg without altering their 
conception of professional integrity? That would seem to require a special claim 
about how the virtue can be possessed. Defenders of the teleological view could bite 
the bullet and grant Greg professional integrity despite his lack of other virtues. On 
this reading, Greg is a raw manifestation of professional integrity, purged of all 
kinds of external side-constraints and independent of other professional virtues. 
Certainly, this strategy identifies a distinct character trait, but it remains an open 
question as to whether this trait is a virtue. Do we value such behavior in the role 
holders we depend on? Advocates of this view might admit that we would not want 
professionals to be so anarchic and dismissive of shared norms but counter that 
integrity is only one of many virtues. At least Greg possesses this one virtue, 
although it would be preferable if he also had others, such as respectfulness and 
collegiality.  
However, this pick-and-mix approach to virtues is untenable. As McDowell 
(1998) puts it, “the particular virtues are not a batch of independent sensitivities” 
(McDowell 1998: 53). His example of kindness illustrates how full possession of a 
virtue requires responsiveness to the requirements of other virtues, such as fairness. 
What elevates a disposition into a virtue is that it is conducive to right action. But 
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the relevant behavior associated with kindness will not always produce right action 
by itself. Suppose, for instance, that one can express kindness by being sensitive to 
Mary’s feelings and granting her request for something. What then if this request is 
granted at the expense of a (still valid) promise one has made to Martin? 
McDowell’s point is that the relevant range of behavior associated with one virtue 
does not lead to right action unless constrained by a sensitivity to other 
considerations—like, as here, promissory rights. In short, there is unity to virtue; 
true kindness is not blind to justice.2 Similarly, dismissing institutional procedures 
and widely accepted norms as misguided conventions is not professional integrity 
but the vice of arrogance. The unity of virtue requires us to reject the claim that 
“respect for patient autonomy, social utility, and justice lie outside the domain of 
professional integrity” (Brody & Miller 1995: 7). Insofar as such broad features of 
medical ethics are genuine values, professional integrity is not indifferent to them; 
rather, it is integrated with them. 
Is the notion of practice-specific goods simply a red herring in addressing the 
question of professional integrity? This seems exaggerated, as the teleological view 
surely captures part of what constitutes the virtue. It is especially disastrous for the 
integrity of a professional to judge and act irresponsibly with regard to goods that 
the practice has asked to be trusted with. Acting with integrity in the name of a 
practice that has promised to promote health requires special rectitude in such 
matters, and any betrayal of this value poses a specific threat to professional 
integrity. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to claim that a physician may think as a 
private individual that active voluntary euthanasia is morally permissible while still 
seeing it as a break with the requirements of professional integrity. However, the 
teleological view does not capture the nature of the judgments that lead to such 
verdicts.  
 
 
The Generic View 
Let us now consider the opposite view—that professional integrity is not a special 
value commitment that transcends patient or client expectations but a virtue that 
gives us reason to trust professionals in the same way that ordinary integrity is a 
trait that gives us reason to rely on the words of friends and confidants. This view 
can be found in many accounts of professional integrity;3 for present purposes, it 
will be useful to discuss a recent version of this view, developed by Greg Scherkoske 
in Integrity and the Virtues of Reason (2013). This account is especially rewarding 
because it emphasizes aspects of integrity that are of particular importance in the 
professional context.  
Scherkoske argues that integrity belongs to the family of epistemic virtues, along 
with traits like intelligence, thoroughness, and open-mindedness. On his account, a 
commitment to the enterprise of excellent judging constitutes integrity (Scherkoske 
2013: 88). Persons of integrity are willing and competent to hold and act upon their 
considered judgments. Unlike people who constantly question their own decisions 
or backslide in the face of social pressure, persons of integrity take their judgments 
seriously and are resolute in the face of temptation to waiver. They trust their own 
convictions when appropriate and suspend their decisions only in light of relevant 
reasons.  
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Central to this account is the idea of connecting integrity to responsibility in 
offering reasons to others. Agents of integrity have an adequate understanding of 
their epistemic position and of what kinds of judgment this position entitles them 
to. They use this understanding to constitute themselves as authors of dependable 
assurances: “People of integrity are constitutively good on their word: that is, they 
are good sources of competent and reliable reasons for action and belief” 
(Scherkoske 2013: 150, italics in original). In other words, persons of integrity are 
careful when they assert, promise, or use other perfomatives aimed at providing 
deliberative assurance to the receiver. They take the associated commitments 
seriously, taking care not to vouch for claims that they are not in a position to 
validate. In other words, they invite others to rely on their judgment only when it is 
responsible to do so.  
Scherkoske’s conception offers more than a phenomenological account of 
common perceptions of integrity; it also vindicates the idea that this is a genuine 
virtue—a character trait of value. His account builds on the plausible 
methodological assumption that both descriptive and normative adequacy are 
required in defending any conception of integrity (Scherkoske 2013: 16–20). 
According to Scherkoske, giving an account of integrity is not just about structuring 
common understandings; it is also about explaining why we are right to value 
integrity. What makes integrity a virtue in its own right is its importance in contexts 
where we depend on others: “Integrity is distinctive partly because of why we want it 
in the persons whom we surround ourselves with, specifically those mentors, friends 
and advisors upon whose judgment we rely” (Scherkoske 2013: 150, italics in 
original).  
Professionals are perhaps the paradigm case of persons whose word is offered as 
trustworthy. It is constitutive of professional roles that they aim at being good 
sources of reasons for belief and action. As the sociologist Everett Hughes 
formulates the “essence of the professional idea,” professionals “profess to know 
better” (Hughes 1984: 375). Physicians purport to know what is good for our health 
and offer their judgment as something to be relied upon. Teachers invite us to trust 
that they know how to educate our children. Lawyers take on our cases with the 
promise that their legal aid is dependable. In short, professions are institutions that 
present themselves as worthy of being entrusted with a key social responsibility. 
In this vein, Andrew Abbott’s influential sociological account describes 
professions as actively requesting the public to treat their word as singularly 
trustworthy: “In claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks society to recognize its 
cognitive structure through exclusive rights” (Abbott 1988: 59). The actual 
transactions may take many forms, of course. As Abbott explains, “In America it is 
ultimately through public opinion that professions establish the power that enables 
them to achieve legal protection. By contrast, on the Continent the state itself has 
traditionally been the professions’ public” (Abbott 1988: 60). The relevant point 
here is that being good on one’s word as a professional involves a responsiveness to 
public expectations engendered by the claim for a socially recognized jurisdiction. 
On this reading, professional practice is constituted by its assurance relation to 
the public. This frames the virtue of professional integrity within a different 
conception of practice than that suggested by the teleological view. In particular, it 
is a deontic conception, emphasizing practice as a source of demands, as opposed to 
an axiological conception that focuses on the internal values of the profession. The 
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general concept of professional practice seems to allow for both readings. 
Nevertheless, the deontic conception is more appropriate for understanding the 
value of professional integrity. Seeing professional practice as constituted by an 
assurance given to the public enables us to connect the virtue to our legitimate 
expectations. As Scherkoske argued, our reasons for seeking integrity in others is an 
important aspect of what makes it a distinct virtue. Given that the public entrusts 
professions with key social responsibilities, it is therefore reasonable to connect the 
virtue to the assurance relation that has been created.  
So far, there has been little reason to doubt the generic view, to which 
Scherkoske’s account is explicitly committed. He claims that distinctions commonly 
made between types of integrity serve only to “make clear the content of the relevant 
set of convictions, in the adherence to which a person expresses her integrity” 
(Scherkoske 2013: 101). That would imply that there are no interesting or 
substantive differences at the conceptual level, and this claim is not without 
plausibility, as Scherkoske has made a strong case that integrity is a matter of 
responsible assurance. Moreover, it has been argued that the notion of assurance is 
partly definitional of the professions. In other words, professionals are bound by the 
mechanisms of responsibility that Scherkoske has referred to in explaining integrity.  
However, this view should also be considered in relation to Greg. Again, Greg 
only cares about getting the diagnosis right; routines, codes and norms are to be 
conformed to only insofar as they are instrumental in solving the case at hand. 
Although Greg fails to live up to the standard image of a doctor, he exhibits much of 
what we associate with ordinary integrity.4 He sticks to his best judgment and 
ignores what he thinks are misguided conventions. He has the courage to put 
conviction over desire for approval, and he has the strength to hold and act upon his 
considered judgments. Certainly, he may deceive his patients and colleagues in 
order to find the key to a particular medical mystery. However, he is generally 
candid about his overall approach, and he is not afraid to state his actual reasons for 
action. He is an integrated agent in the sense that his mind is made up on matters of 
importance, and he speaks his mind when questioned. But is this sufficient to meet 
the standard of professional integrity? 
Defenders of the generic view hold that the ordinary virtue of integrity is 
sufficient to secure an appropriate responsiveness to role-dependent expectations. 
However, if that were so, we should ascribe professional integrity to anyone who 
maintains personal integrity in the work context. The case of Greg illustrates how 
this creates an internal conflict in the generic view, because it runs counter to 
Scherkoske’s own requirement of normative adequacy. As he claims above, integrity 
is distinct largely because of why we want it in people we rely on. His conception of 
ordinary integrity seems plausible partly because it vindicates our sense that it is 
valuable. But this normative condition of conceptual distinctness actually points 
towards a divide between ordinary and professional integrity. We value professional 
integrity in role holders largely because it prevents them from acting like Greg. As 
patients or clients, we encounter professionals as representatives of practices with 
standards that are supposed to warrant our trust. Whatever one may think of Greg 
as an illustration of ordinary integrity, he is not good on his word as a professional. 
He does not take his practice seriously as a shared enterprise with common 
principles but sees his role as guided solely by his personal judgment.  
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Evidently, Greg’s opinions on the authority of various norms of professional 
ethics are likely to diverge significantly from the views of the people who depend on 
him. This means that the generic view fails according to its own standard; in 
holding professional integrity to be essentially the same virtue as ordinary integrity, 
the connection with warranted assurance is lost. That is because the reasons for 
wanting integrity in persons qua persons differ from the reasons for wanting 
integrity in role holders qua role holders. When a friend offers advice on how I 
should deal with a conflict, integrity requires her to state herself as the source of 
reasons. I value my friend’s integrity as excellence in standing for her own beliefs 
rather than merely paying lip service to what I might approve of (cf. Calhoun 1995). 
She remains an integrated person by giving her word in a manner that reflects 
genuine conviction. 
Scherkoske would presumably agree that the value of professional integrity does 
not refer to personal conviction in this straightforward sense. As already mentioned, 
his own notion of warranted assurance would disqualify Greg from being good on 
the word of his practice. Nevertheless, the generic view fails to give us an account of 
what Greg should be doing instead. What we need is an account that describes a 
mode of practical reasoning that can live up to this standard. As discussed in 
relation to the entrusted nature of professional practice, the standard of assurance 
that Scherkoske associates with integrity has definite appeal in the professional 
context. For the remainder of this paper, I will defend the claim that integrity as 
responsibility to be good on one’s word takes on a distinct form in the professional 
context. Professional agents hold roles that purport to be trustworthy in light of 
their public standards, and this implies a break with the view that integrity is 
generic.  
 
 
The Interpretive View 
The central claim of the interpretive view is that for professional integrity to connect 
with assurance it must be an interpretive virtue. I develop this view by following the 
lead provided by Andrew Edgar and Stephen Pattison (2011). They characterize 
professional integrity as a mode of reasoning that calls for the role holder to engage 
critically and creatively with the varied and sometimes conflicting demands of 
practice. They describe the virtue as both an “interpretive stance” and a “deliberative 
capacity and competence which is deployed in the context of complex professional 
and organizational work to find appropriate answers and ways forward” (Edgar & 
Pattison 2011: 103). Daniel E. Wueste (2014) emphasizes something similar in his 
discussion of cheating and the duty to report it within academic institutions; 
integrity requires recognition that ethical decisions are “situated” in a “cluster of 
relationships that enriches but also, inevitably, makes things complicated rather 
than simple” (Wueste 2014: 20).  
These approaches indicate a conception of professional integrity in which 
interpretive and evaluative engagement with practice is central. In developing the 
interpretive view, I will connect the notions of being “situated” and taking an 
“interpretive stance” more systematically to professional integrity. First, what is the 
fundamental normative relation that governs the situation? It is a promissory 
relation, where the profession has given its word to the public. Role holders are 
situated as promisors. What is the object of interpretation? It is professional practice 
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as a framework for decision-making. The main idea is that for professionals to be 
good on the word of their practice, they must act on a defensible interpretation of 
what their practice has promised.  
The first step is to give Greg the proper moral diagnosis, and it has been argued 
here that the two preceding views could not do so. His main failure is not a betrayal 
of health, the key good of his practice. Nor is it a lack of willingness or competence 
to stand behind his considered judgments. Rather, he lacks professional integrity 
because he does not act in the name of his practice. Formal requirements, codes of 
ethics, institutional hierarchies, and collegial norms are among the features of 
professional practice that engender public expectations of professional role holders. 
For example, Greg’s medical practice is subject to norms regarding respectful 
consultation and patient autonomy. Greg does not acknowledge the authority of 
these standards, which means that the word of the practice does not have the 
normative force to override his personal judgment.  
Evidently, the alternative to Greg cannot simply be Holmes’s dreaded “plain 
practical workman,” who simply acts on the most straightforward and literal 
reading of role requirements. As already mentioned, professional integrity is often 
associated with a refusal to carry out certain role requirements (e.g. abortion and 
euthanasia). We do not wish to entrust key social goods such as health, education, 
and legal justice to role holders who surrender their ethical judgment in executing 
their role. In developing the interpretive view here, the goal is to provide an 
alternative to both Greg and the practical workman, both of whom fail to achieve an 
integrated understanding of the practice they represent. Greg does not integrate his 
sense of professional purpose with the existing features of practice. The practical 
workman, on the other hand, does not integrate his interpretation of practice with a 
sense of purpose. It is time to introduce a third character.  
In articulating the interpretive view, it will be helpful to borrow the figure of a 
“chain novelist” from the theory of adjudication developed by Ronald Dworkin. He 
compares the task of judges to the task of authors engaged in a “chain novel” 
(Dworkin 1985: 158–162; 1986: 228–238). This comparison elicits a mode of 
reasoning that has general relevance in the professions. A chain novel is written one 
chapter at a time, and each finished chapter is passed along to a new author, who 
writes the next one. The task of each author is to make this the best novel it can be. 
It must unfold as a coherent story rather than as a mishmash of different visions. 
This calls for an integrated view of the story elements. The chain novelist “must take 
up some view about the novel in progress, some working theory about its 
characters, plot genre, theme, and point, in order to decide what counts as 
continuing and not as beginning anew” (Dworkin 1986: 230). According to 
Dworkin, this analogy is apt both to describe and to justify the actions of judges, 
who know that they are deciding disputes in the name of a practice that has given 
principled verdicts in similar cases. The good judge views earlier decisions “as part 
of a long story he must interpret and then continue, according to his own judgment 
of how to make the developing story as good as it can be” (Dworkin 1986: 239).  
Why suppose that the figure of a chain novelist has relevance for professional 
integrity? Judges are continuing the “story” of law in a readily comprehensible 
sense, but their standard for decision-making is not obviously applicable to 
professional roles in general. In order to see the relevance of the chain novelist, we 
must consider why the analogy was introduced in the first place. The theory of legal 
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adjudication is a response to the fact that judges have to decide “hard cases” that 
cannot be read straight off the books. How statutes should be applied or precedent 
invoked is usually open to argument when cases reach court. Judges must rule in 
favor of a particular reading of the law; the question is what makes one reading 
better than another. The key end of legal practice is justice, so one might suppose 
that decisions are better or worse according to the standard of justice. That is, good 
legal decisions aim for outcomes that conform to a vision of what is morally due to 
those involved. This sort of answer would suit Greg, if he were a judge. It fits his 
mode of operation, which is to focus directly on the key end of his profession. 
However, it would also reintroduce the problems we encountered above. What 
counts as a just outcome is open to considerable disagreement, and the direct 
application of justice therefore places too much responsibility on the role holder 
while failing to explain the authority of the decision.  
 Dworkin’s standard for adjudication involves justice, but not as a direct measure 
of the quality of legal decisions. As he emphasizes, there is no “license for each judge 
to find in doctrinal history whatever he thinks should have been there” (Dworkin, 
1985: 160). His figure of the chain novelist is opposed to the idea that judges should 
be guided directly by their perception of moral desert. Rather, their role is to reach 
an integrated view, where justice is draped “in workclothes,” as one commentator 
has put it (Postema 1997). That is, judgments are informed by a conception of 
justice contained within the grounds of existing law. This conception is likely to be 
imperfect by the judge’s own lights, just as a chain novelist will be disappointed with 
certain story developments. Nevertheless, neither role holder is entitled to start with 
a blank slate or make decisions untainted by compromise.  
This barely scratches the surface of Dworkin’s complex theory of legal 
adjudication, but it helps to show how the chain novelist represents a mode of 
reasoning that distinguishes professional integrity. Unlike being good on one’s word 
as an ordinary agent, the professional agent represents a practice that has 
engendered a multifarious set of legitimate expectations. Professionals face the 
interpretive challenge of trying to understand how such provisions as codes, 
organizational procedures, and norms constitute the word of the profession. Like 
the chain novelist, they must make their decisions in light of an understanding of 
what others have done, why they have done it, and what this entitles the public to 
expect. The next two sections will elaborate this idea by defending it against two 
objections.  
 
 
Why Interpret? 
The first objection concerns the need for interpretation. One can accept Dworkin’s 
model of legal adjudication and still deny that it captures anything essential about 
professional integrity. Is interpretive judgment a distinct and essential aspect of 
professional integrity? One reason to doubt the relevance of the chain novelist is 
that the case of judges is idiosyncratic, as they must make decisions that are 
inherently tied to interpretive disputes. Judges are in court in the first place because 
of disagreements over legal decisions, which means their integrity is obviously 
dependent on responsibility in interpretation.  
However, the idea here is not that every professional role involves interpretive 
tasks on a par with adjudication. It is difficult to see, for instance, how the 
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interpretations made during surgery are similar in any relevant way to legal 
interpretation. Instead, the claim is that all professional roles are executed in the 
name of a practice, and that the word of the practice requires interpretation 
precisely because the practical import of the assurance relation is open to reasonable 
disagreement. Nevertheless, even this claim may seem suspect. One could claim that 
the mission of the classic professional roles is settled and that no fundamental 
disputes remain—that is, that professional practice does not require an interpretive 
stance. 
To find an illustrative case for this objection, we need look no further than the 
role of legal representatives. The role of lawyers is supposedly to defend the interests 
of their clients by means of the various instruments available to them through the 
legal system. A good lawyer will “without fear defend the interests of his client and 
without regard to any unpleasant consequences for himself or to any other person” 
(International Code of Ethics, 1956/1964, 6.6). Lawyers owe loyalty only to their 
clients, and their mission is to secure every possible advantage obtainable through 
the legal system. For example, they may use delaying tactics in order to make it too 
costly for the opponent to proceed, or instigate countersuits merely to create 
conflicts of interest. In short, they offer their skills to the client without any concern 
for legal deserts. The adversarial system will in itself realize legal justice; lawyers 
need not be directly concerned with this end. Why, then, should interpretive 
judgments matter here?  
This objection is misguided in a sense that helps to clarify the point of the 
interpretive view. Anyone who held this view of the lawyer’s role would be offering 
a deeply evaluative understanding of the notion of zealous representation. In Tim 
Dare’s terminology, they would interpret the lawyer role as committed to “hyper-
zeal” instead of “mere-zeal” (Dare 2009: 76–86). Hyper-zeal is concerned merely 
with the interests of clients. This attitude recommends using tricks of the trade to 
secure every possible advantage obtainable with legal instruments. Mere-zeal, on the 
other hand, is about achieving the proper legal deserts for clients. The goal is to 
secure legal entitlements rather than interests as such. Dare delivers a forceful 
defense of mere-zeal as the proper understanding of zealous representation. In 
doing this, he is taking a normative stand on what it means to be good on the word 
of the practice. The point here is not to argue in favor of the notion of mere-zeal but 
rather to emphasize the disputed nature of the ends of professional practice. As 
noted by another author, Dare’s interpretation “strikes some lawyers as deeply 
confused” (Wendel 2010: 79).  
The ends of medical practice are no less disputed. The previously mentioned 
claim by Cocking and Oakley that active voluntary euthanasia involves a betrayal of 
the key good of medicine aimed in part to explain how health as an end 
distinguishes medical professional integrity. However, in referring to the article by 
Miller and Brody (1995), they inadvertently reveal how professional integrity is 
bound up with interpretive judgment of the role. Miller and Brody do not tie 
medical integrity to the pursuit of health in any straightforward sense. Instead, they 
state three fundamental goals for the practice of medicine: healing, promoting 
health, and helping patients to a peaceful and dignified death (Miller & Brody 1995: 
11). These diverging views on the nature of medicine lead to different framings of 
particular decisions. Those who reject the act of helping patients to a peaceful and 
dignified death as a fundamental goal of medicine are also likely to reject 
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institutional procedures and requirements for euthanasia as legitimate parts of 
practice. For these role holders, their understanding of medicine does not extend to 
helping patients to a dignified death. Insofar as they conform to institutional 
regulations connected to euthanasia, they consider this to be external to their true 
practice.  
Many accounts of professional integrity emphasize the complexity of cases and 
the conflicting expectations that professionals encounter. The above examples from 
law and medicine indicate how responsible resolution of such complexity and 
conflict builds on an interpretation of the word of the practice. The normative force 
of client and patient requests depends on what role holders understand their role to 
be. Am I the mouthpiece of my client? Does my practice involve helping patients to 
a dignified death? Professionals of integrity reason responsibly about such 
questions. They see themselves as part of a practice that has offered its word to the 
public, and they recognize their responsibility to achieve clarity about what this 
means. In this regard, the notion of interpretation as highlighted by the figure of the 
chain novelist expresses a distinct and important dimension of professional 
integrity.  
 
 
Why Respect Flawed Decisions? 
The second objection to the interpretive view concerns the connection between 
professional integrity and features of practice that are judged by the role holder to 
be misguided or inadequate. The interpretive view requires role holders to continue 
the story they are part of, even when it rests on decisions that one disagrees with. 
For example, professionals of integrity comply with established norms of patient 
autonomy even when they believe that patients would be better off in a more 
paternalistic institution. Neither the teleological view nor the generic view offers any 
reason to think that role holders of integrity should comply with flawed decisions. 
However, one might counter that this is a strength of these views, and that 
professional integrity is antithetical to compromise. In rejecting Greg as a model of 
professional integrity, are we not disconnecting this virtue from the notion of 
morally responsible judgment?  
This objection gains momentum from the plausible constraint that Gabriele 
Taylor places on integrity’s deliberative point of view: “The person of integrity will 
not repeatedly act against her evaluations” (Taylor 1985: 119). Any account of 
professional integrity lacks credibility if it denies that actions should be responsive 
to one’s best judgment. How does this reflect on the figure of the chain novelist, 
who complies with flawed decisions? Unlike Greg, who always acts according to his 
own vision, the good chain novelist continues the story in ways that cohere with the 
preceding installments. So, is the interpretive view more interested in coherence 
than in getting it right?  
This objection rests on a misleading distinction between aiming for coherence 
and acting on one’s best judgment. It fails to acknowledge that the relevant 
coherence is a matter of fidelity to the assurance given to the public. Professionals of 
integrity are good on the word of their practice, which requires integration of the 
various features of practice into a coherent response to legitimate expectations. 
While this may involve integrating flawed decisions, it is not a call for a surrender of 
judgment or action against one’s own evaluations. On the contrary, professionals of 
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integrity act according to their best reading of practice. Moreover, their 
interpretation proceeds on the background condition that the practice is a justifiable 
social institution. As such, it holds authority for the role holder as a legitimate 
framework for action in circumstances of reasonable disagreement on how to realize 
values such as health promotion, legal justice, or education provision. There is no 
contrast between integrity and moral judgment here because the legitimate role is 
constituted by a binding social agreement on what counts as legitimate grounds for 
professional action.  
Compare this with Kant’s (2009) conception of the use of reason in entrusted 
offices. He describes the clergyman who disagrees with the doctrines of the church. 
As he notes, this priest is acting in “someone else’s name” and will therefore 
expound the teachings of the church in the entrusted manner. However, Kant 
emphasizes that misguided features of his practice are not simply executed without 
interpretive judgment: 
 
He then extracts as much practical value as possible for his congregation from 
precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with full conviction, but which 
he can nevertheless undertake to expound since it is not in fact wholly impossible 
that they may contain truth (Kant 2009: 5).  
 
This remark is interesting because it identifies two tasks for evaluative judgment. 
First, the features of practice that form the material for interpretation must be 
reasonable or legitimate. This coheres with the account of integrity defended above. 
Professionals of integrity do not integrate illegitimate aspects of practice into their 
understanding of the role. For example, priests are divided on the issue of gay 
marriage. Priests who believe that it is sinful to carry out such ceremonies are 
prevented by their professional integrity to do so. Other priests may hold that the 
directives rest on a reasonable conception of core religious values, even though they 
would not themselves recommend the institutionalization of gay marriage. The latter 
group is not prevented by their professional integrity to carry out the ceremony. In 
Kant’s words, role holders of integrity comply with directives when it is not “wholly 
impossible that they may contain truth.”  
The second task of evaluative judgment mentioned by Kant is to “extract as 
much practical value as possible” from the given materials of the role. This task is 
constructive, and the interpretive view emphasizes that it must be guided by a sense 
of professional purpose. The figure of the chain novelist represents a particular 
mode of extracting value in light of professional purpose. Like chain novelists, 
professionals of integrity join the narrative of a story that is partially developed but 
not predetermined. The challenge is to continue the story in a way that realizes its 
best potential. Ideally, judgments made in the name of professional practice draw on 
grounds that affirm the assurance relation to the public. These judgments are 
informed by existing rules and procedures in a way that realizes the word given to 
the public.  
 
   
Conclusion  
The interpretive view explains professional integrity as a virtue concerned with both 
fidelity to practice and assurance to the public, connecting these features by 
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emphasizing the role of evaluative judgment. In being good on the word of their 
practice, professionals of integrity are responsive to the entrusted nature of their 
responsibility. From various sources of legitimate expectations, they extract the 
most compelling vision of how to realize the ends of their profession. Like chain 
novelists who must continue a partly written story, they recognize the normative 
force of even the flawed features of practice and integrate them into their 
conception of the role.  
However, good chain novelists recognize when the story has gone astray and are 
obligated to bring it back on track. In this regard, the interpretive view highlights 
how objections in the name of professional integrity deliver a distinct verdict. 
Requirements that conflict with professional integrity are not merely wrong or 
misguided; they represent a break with the word of the practice. The force of such a 
verdict is obscured when integrity is interpreted as loyalty to an “internal” morality, 
narrowly concerned with profession-specific ends. That conception reduces 
professional integrity to a matter of preserving the domestic purity of practice. The 
true merit of the virtue lies elsewhere. Its importance is explained by the aim of 
making our trust in role holders warranted. Objections that appeal to professional 
integrity address the public as promisee. The justificatory weight of such appeals 
depends on whether the alleged break is supported by a responsible reading of 
practice.  
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Notes 
1 In this regard, we can distinguish between a wide and narrow reading of the 
teleological view. On the wide reading, the profession-specific good that 
professional integrity is concerned with includes considerations of justice, patient 
autonomy, etc. It is possible to argue that Cocking and Oakley belong in this wide 
category because of two features of their account: first, their inclusion of “side 
constraints” that regulate the means to pursue the internal goals of practice; second, 
their slightly paradoxically formulated idea that health as the proper goal of 
medicine is more than health (Cocking & Oakley 2001: 90–92). However, the wide 
reading leads to further questions concerning how integrity is conceived as a unified 
virtue when tied to a wider array of considerations. It is, at best, the beginnings of an 
account of professional integrity.  
2 I am only committed to what Gary Watson (1984) calls the “weak unity thesis,” 
which says that in order to have one virtue you must be sensitive to considerations 
relevant to the others. McDowell endorses the stronger claim that “no one virtue 
can be fully possessed except by a possessor of all of them” (McDowell 1998: 53).  
3 Cox, La Caze and Levine (2003: 103) attribute the generic view to Benjamin (1990, 
chs. 3 and 6), Calhoun (1995), Grant (1997), and Halfon (1989). To some extent, 
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this attribution rests on implicit assumptions in the texts. Cox, La Caze and Levine 
provide a brief critical discussion of the view in general terms, but as Pritchard 
(2006: 67–68) has argued, their own alternative goes too far in the other direction, as 
they make professional integrity a distinct virtue for every individual profession.  
4 Greg’s disregard for general moral considerations does not disqualify him from 
being an agent of integrity on Scherkoske’s account, in which the connection 
between integrity and moral conviction is allegedly “frequent but contingent” 
(Scherkoske 2013: 63). Scherkoske claims that standards of ordinary integrity can be 
understood in a non-moral sense. On his account, failure to be good on one’s word 
is an “abuse of the illocutionary norms and commitments internal to assurance” 
(Scherkoske 2013: 179); so, lack of integrity amounts to abuse of perfomatives like 
promising or assertion, but supposedly, this does not necessarily involve moral 
standards.   
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